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NOTES
EUROPEAN UNION POLICY ON ASYLUM AND ITS
INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Recent world events in Europe have triggered a massive
influx of people into the European Union ("E.U." or "the Un-
ion", formerly "European Community" or "E.C.").' This immi-
gration crisis has been augmented and perpetuated by the
German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Yugoslavian and Albanian civil wars, the unemployment crisis,
and the unstable free-market economies resulting from the
transition from communism to democracy.2 Over the past year,
several Member States of the European Union, including Ger-
many, Italy, Britain, and the Netherlands, have experienced
significant increases in asylum applications.'
1 The European Union was established in 1992 with the signing of a treaty in
Maastricht, the Netherlands. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) art. A, 31 I.L.M. 247, 255 (1992) [hereinafter
MAASTRICHT TREATY].
2 In Europe, "immigration" often translates into "asylum," in part because
more data is available on asylum applications than on illegal entries. See Resolu-
tion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM(94)23 at 5, para. 13.
* See EU Ministers Back Task Force To Coordinate Asylum Policy, AP
WORLDSTREAM, Dec. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Apgrmn File. In
1998, asylum applications in Britain rose 30% compared to 1997, standing at
33,000 for the first 10 months of 1998. See id. Similarly, for the same time period,
asylum applications in Belgium were up by 57%. See id. In November 1998 alone,
Germany, the largest recipient nation with almost 30% of the European Union's
asylum cases, registered 10,800 new demands. See id. Of the 12,208 asylum de-
mands processed in November 1998 by the German immigration and border con-
trol authorities, only 423, or 3.5%, were accepted. See id.
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Throughout the 1990s, Western Europe has been marked
by an out-of-control asylum system.4 The flood of asylum ap-
plications required the European Union to develop an asylum
policy, the timing of which coincided with the economic inte-
gration of the European Union. Therefore, the need to accom-
plish the political and economic goals of the European Union,
which include the "free movement of persons, transparency of
the labor market, and political unity," supported the decision
to harmonize immigration and asylum policies.' At the present
time, however, while the progress of European integration is
self-evident, the development of E.U. asylum policy continues
to lack a "lowest common denominator"6 of restrictive mea-
sures and is shadowed by uncoordinated immigration and
asylum policies.
Specifically, E.U. Member States have been unable to
agree on how to implement the free movement of persons at
the Union level, although progress has been achieved at the re-
gional level in the form of intergovernmental agreements. Two
such notable documents are the Schengen7 and Dublin8 Con-
ventions, in which Member States have agreed to impose a
series of restrictions and barriers on access to asylum seek-
ers? Common mechanisms include the imposition of new visa
requirements, carrier sanctions that impose fines on airlines
that accept passengers with improper documentation, denial of
entry at frontiers, arrangements to return asylum applicants to
countries through which they initially travel, refusal to allow
' See Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary 'Ref-
uge" and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 13, 37 (1994).
' Kenneth Regensburg, Note, Refugee Law Reconsidered: Reconciling Humani-
tarian Objectives With The Protectionist Agendas Of Western Europe And The Unit-
ed States, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 225, 235-38 (1996).
' Jacqueline Bhabha, European Harmonization Of Asylum Policy: A Flawed
Process, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 101, 101-02 (1994).
Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, June 14, 1985, Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991) (Conven-
tion applying the Agreement enacted June 19, 1990) [hereinafter Schengen Agree-
ment and Convention].
' Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for
Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June
15, 1990, Fr.-F.R.G.-Port.-Spain-Belg.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 425 (1991) [hereinafter
Dublin Convention].
' See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7; see also Dublin
Convention, supra note 8.
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entry to asylum seekers who appeal the decision to remain in a
given country, and narrow interpretation of refugee standards
by restricting asylum to, for example, those who fear individu-
al persecution by state agents only.10
This Note analyzes how some of the restrictive measures
of the Schengen and Dublin Conventions directly conflict with
and breach Member States' duties under both the Geneva Con-
vention as well as other international human rights instru-
ments. Part I of this Note sets forth important principles of
refugee law and humanitarian rights. It also analyzes the
"refugee" definition of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees" and discusses signatories' obligations
under such Conventions.
Part II examines the Schengen and Dublin Conventions,
which comprise a significant portion of the body of refugee law
developed by the European Union. An important common prin-
ciple of both the Schengen and Dublin Conventions is that
States legitimately can rely upon each other's asylum deci-
sions. This principle raises the following legal concerns as to
the States' obligations under Article 33 of the Geneva Conven-
tion: Both the Schengen and Dublin Conventions encourage
unfair immigration policies by forcing their signatories to stiff-
en their asylum policies. The Conventions further violate the
Geneva Convention by prohibiting asylum applicants access to
the forum of their choice. Finally, E.U. Member States demon-
strate a reluctance to enter into far-reaching obligations to
grant admission to, as opposed to non-return of, refugees, ques-
tioning, therefore, the well-established principle of
nonrefoulment.
Part III of this Note offers a solution whereby a common
authority would have the power to adjudicate and enforce theimmigration and asylum laws within the entire Western Euro-
pean territory. This common authority could assign part of the
regional funds, distributed by the European Monetary Union
as a response to new members' accession, to new members
10 See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7; see also Dublin
Convention, supra note 8.
" Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal so that these poorer, less
secure States could properly address their immigration
problems.
I. PRINCIPLES OF REFUGEE LAw AND HuMANITARIAN RIGHTS
A. Roadmap Of Various Charters
The United Nations Charter, adopted on June 26, 1945, is
the first multilateral treaty that sets forth the States' obliga-
tion to treat aliens humanely and respect human rights gener-
ally. 2 The preamble to the U.N. Charter provides that "[wie
the peoples of the United Nations determined... to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small.., have resolved to combine our
efforts to accomplish these aims ... ,, Article 1 proclaims
that the purpose of the United Nations is to cooperate "in pro-
moting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all."4 Although the U.N. Charter does not specifically address
aliens' rights per se, Article 55(c) of the Charter reaffirms that
the United Nations shall promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 5
Moreover, under Article 56, "[a]ll Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Orga-
nization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Arti-
cle 55."16 Thus, the U.N. Charter imposes obligations on each
Member of the United Nations, as a matter of international
law, to respect and observe human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion."
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") sets forth international standards that States should
follow in their treatment of both citizens and foreigners. 8 Ar-
11 See U.N. CHARTER preamble.
13 Id.
14 Id. at art. 1.
15 Id. at art. 55.
16 Id. at art. 56.
17 See PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 63 (1983).
18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G-A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
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ticle 1 of the UDHR provides that "[aill human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a
spirit of brotherhood." 9 Article 2 prohibits discrimination by
stating that "[elveryone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis
of political, jurisdictional or international status of the country
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be indepen-
dent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty."" The UDHR also provides that "[elveryone has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
border of each state,"2' "[e]veryone has the right to seek and
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,"22 and that
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied his right to change his nationality."23 Thus, by using
generally-defined terms such as "everyone," "no one," or "all
human beings," the UDHR implicitly addresses the rights of
aliens as well as nationals.
In addition to the above, the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees' is considered the "center of the inter-
national legal framework for the protection of refugees."'m The
Sess., at 71, 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Some
argue that the UDHR is a document of international law to which every state
should adhere. See A. H. ROBERTSON & J. G. MlERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD 26 (3d ed. 1989). ("[Tjhe General Assembly proclaims this Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations . . . ." (citation omitted)) Others argue that because the UDHR is
merely a declaration, it is not, by itself, legally binding. See Ahcene Boulesbaa, A
Comparative Study Between the International Law and the United States Supreme
Court Standards for Equal and Human Rights in the Treatment of Aliens, 4 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 445, 457 n.61 (quoting Professor H. Waldock, General Course on Pub-
lic International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 199 (1962-II)).
19 UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 1.
20 UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 2.
21 UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 13(1).
" UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 14(2).
" UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 15(2).
24 See Geneva Convention, supra note 11.
25 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Addendum, Supp. No. 9, 12A, para. 19(c), U.N. Doc.
A/48/12/Add.1 (1993). In 1998, 134 states have ratified either the Geneva Conven-
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Geneva Convention definition of "refugee" has "dominated the
regime of refugee law for the past three decades."" Specifical-
ly, a "refugee" is any person who, "owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country."2'
Under the Geneva Convention, and its later 1967 Protocol,
the most important and fundamental right to be protected in
international law is the right of the refugee not to be returned
to the place of his or her home country to face persecution.28
A cornerstone in the refugee's platform of rights, this concept,
known as "nonrefoulment," proclaims that "[N]o Contracting
State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."29
B. The Geneva Convention Under Attack
While unarguably a staunch stalwart in the battle for
aliens' rights, the text of the Geneva Convention is unclear on
two issues: (1) whether Member States are obligated to allow
the asylum seeker at the border to enter their territories while
pending clarification and determination of refugee status and
(2) whether Member States are allowed to exercise their right
to return asylum seekers to a country where they would fear
tion or its 1967 Protocol.
"' Kay Hailbronner, Nonrefoulment and 'Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary
International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS:
REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 123, 124 (1986).
27 Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at 152, art. 1.
21 See id. at 176, art. 33.
29 Id. Additional instruments of states that affirm the principle of
nonrefoulment for refugees seeking entry at international borders are the Organi-
zation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, Comm. of Ministers, Eur. Consult. Ass., Rec. No. R(84)1, Jan
25, 1984 and Res. (67) 14, June 29, 1967; American Convention on Human Rights,
done Nov. 22, 1969; and the Asian-African Legal Consult. Comm. Principles Con-
cerning Treatment of Refugees, Art. VII(3), 1966, reprinted in UNHCR, Collection
of International Instruments Concerning Refugees 201 (1979).
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persecution." Specifically, the Geneva Convention does not
require Member States to grant admission to qualified asylum
seekers, but merely to refrain from returning them."' The
1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum ex-
panded upon the language of the Geneva Convention by explic-
itly including refusal of admission at the border as a part of
the nonrefoulment process." This principle of nonrefoulment
is commonly considered a norm of international law. In fact,
some commentators support the view that, based on state prac-
tice as evidence of a rule of customary international law, Mem-
ber States are unquestionably prohibited from returning
humanitarian refugees to countries where they face
persecution.33
The traditional, legal right of individuals to claim asylum,
a right held sacred by the Geneva Convention, currently is
under attack in Western Europe. Before the onset of the new
millennium, Europe is pressing for passage of a proposal draft-
ed by Austria, the current holder of the European Union's
presidency, which would to stop the incessant outflow of illegal
immigrants.34 Premised on the notion that the Geneva Con-
vention now covers only a small minority of refugees and that
the E.U.'s "fortress Europe" has failed in the past five years,
the Austrian plan is designed to cope with sudden immigration
influxes of those displaced by inter-ethnic conflicts, such as in
the case of Bosnia, Kosovo or Kurdistan.35
"o See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 246 (1996).
31 See Geneva Convention, supra note 11.
32 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). The Declaration provides, in part,
that no person "shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or,
if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or
compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution." Id. at
81.
3See G. Goodwin-Gill, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-75 (1983).
" See Fortress Europe's Four Circles of Purgatory, GUARDIAN (Manchester,
Eng.), Oct. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File [hereinafter
Four Circles].
" See EU Proposals for Refugees 'Will Wipe Out Asylum Rights," GUARDIAN
(Manchester, Eng.), Sept. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS News, Guardn File. The
first phase of the proposal addresses only the emergency cases on the ground,
either by peacekeeping or "safe zones." Id. The second stage would try to keep the
refugees in only one region, or "temporary camps," as those adopted for the Pales-
tinians refugees from Israel in 1948. Id. The third stage would allow temporary
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Instead of guaranteeing individuals their legal right to
asylum, Austria suggests that the Geneva Convention be "sup-
plemented, amended or replaced." 6 In its stead, the E.U.
countries would make only a "political offer," refusing to confer
legal status based on right to those defined as "refugees" under
the Geneva Convention."1 Thus, under the Austrian treat-
ment, the denial to refugees of only the right to settle in the
European Union will mean the death of the Geneva
Convention.
II. ASYLUM POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Harmonization and the Migration Policy
Over the past twenty years, the Member States of the
European Union increasingly have pondered the idea of Euro-
pean harmonization and integration. The main goal of this
complex and fundamentally social concept is to increase the
cohesiveness of society.3" Indeed, as one commentator has as-
serted, "whereas a divided Europe represents a group of pawns
on the chessboard of international politics, a united Europe
would be more like a queen." 9
The achievement of a single internal market, an "ultimate
purpose of the Union," depends in part upon the creation of a
"common regime" on different issues addressing the entry into
the Union of non-Europeans via asylum/immigration." The
ambitious goals of free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital along with political unity and "transparency" of the
internal market4 requires a substantial coordination of non-
residence without the right to work in an E.U. State, with all Member States
sharing the expenses. See id. Finally, the fturth phase would require refugees'
repatriation to their homelands as soon as circumstances allow. See id.
"' Four Circles, supra note 34.
37 Id.
38 See ANDREW W. AXLINE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 2 (1968).
39 GUNNAR SJOSTEDT, THE EXTERNAL ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1
(1977).
0 Marie-Claire S.F.G. Foblets, Europe and Its Aliens After Maastricht: The
Painful Move to Substantive Harmonization of Member-States' Policies Toward
Third-Country Nationals, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 783, 787 (1994).
41 See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Declaration on Asylum, 31
I.L.M. 247, 373 (identifying harmonization of asylum as an aim of the European
1224 [Vol. 64: 4
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E.U. immigration.42 Thus, the harmonization of immigration
and asylum policies in Europe is a necessary means of
achieving the political and economic goals of the European
Union. Specific measures undertaken to achieve the European
harmonization of immigration and asylum policies include the
1990 Schengene and Dublin Conventions.
B. The Schengen Convention of 1990
The Schengen Convention ("Convention")45 has its origins
in the 1985 Schengen Agreement ("Agreement").46  The
Agreement encompasses main provisions and general goals
relating to the movement of persons.47 The Agreement pro-
vides for the abolition of all border controls within the area of
the signatory States and the strengthening of the external
borders of the Schengen nations.48 In addition, Title II of the
Agreement requires the Parties to "endeavor to abolish the
controls at the common frontiers and transfer them to their
external frontiers,"49  favoring free trade and market
harmonization.
The Schengen signatories were concerned, however, not
only with the movement of goods and services, but also with
the control of non-E.C. immigration." Article 17 of the Agree-
ment specifically provides that the Parties "shall endeavor to
harmonize... the Laws and administrative provisions con-
cerning the prohibitions and restrictions which form the basis
for the controls and to take complementary measures to safe-
Conference).
42 See Kay Hailbronner & Jorg Polakiewicz, Non-EC Nationals in the European
Community: The Need for a Coordinated Approach, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
49, 77-79 (1992).
Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7.
Dublin Convention, supra note 8.
Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7.
'6 Id. On June 14, 1985, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
Benelux Countries--Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg-signed the Schengen
Agreement.
47 See Jaap W. de Zwaan, Institutional Problems and Free Movement of Per-
sons; The Legal and Political Framework for Cooperation, in FREE MOVEMENT OF
PERSONS IN EUROPE 335, 344 (Henry G. Schermers et al. eds., 1993).
48 See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 79, art. 17.
49 Id.
" See Jean-Francois Bellis, Introductory Note, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
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guard security and combat illegal immigration by nationals of
States that are not members of the European Communities.""1
Imposing few obligations upon the parties, the Agreement did
not require ratification, but only application on a provisional
basis.52
The Convention, signed by nine E.U. Member States53
five years later, provides rules and key measures for achieving
and implementing the goals defined in the 1985 Agreement.
Indeed, the Convention abolishes border controls along the
common frontiers of signatories by permitting the crossing of
internal borders "without any checks on persons."' This "com-
plete" freedom of movement, however, is restricted for non-E.C.
nationals who must "declare" themselves "in accordance with
the conditions imposed by each Contracting Party."55 This ob-
ligation applies even to resident aliens when they travel within
Schengen territory.56 Thus, for example, a French citizen trav-
eling to or from Germany has "complete" freedom of movement,
whereas a Bulgarian citizen traveling from Germany to France
will be required to present proper documentation, in accor-
dance with the provisions of each E.U. country she or he
crosses.
The abolition of border control, an important landmark in
E.U. development, is only one aspect of the Schengen package.
In recognizing that, by itself, the border control abolition would
create a "security deficit," the Schengen signatories further
agreed to introduce a "comprehensive security package" based
upon common visa and asylum policies, identity cards through-
out the Schengen territory, a "hot pursuit" agency for law en-
forcement agencies up to ten kilometers from neighboring
borders, and a computer-based network called the Schengen
Information System.57
" Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 79, art. 17.
52 See id. at 83, art. 32.
" The Schengen Group consists of the three Benelux countries, France, Germa-
ny, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Austria has been granted observer status,
and Denmark has requested observer status. See Schengen Agreement and Con-
vention, supra note 7.
" Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 86, art. 2(1). In the
interest of public or national security, limited internal border checks may be main-
tained so long as the party consults with the other parties. Id. at 86, art. 2(2).
Id. at 93, art. 22(1).
" See id. at 93, art. 22(2).
' See Repelling Borders; European Border Controls, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCY
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Despite the above security package, Article 23 of the Con-
vention, which deals with the movement of aliens generally,
restricts, by express reference to the Geneva Convention, the
right of the contracting parties to expel an alien. 8 In addi-
tion, Article 28 reaffirms the commitment of the parties not
only to the Geneva Convention but to cooperation with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.59 Parties to
the Schengen Convention are required to "process any applica-
tion for asylum lodged by an alien within the territory of any
one of them." ° Notwithstanding the above general commit-
ment to the Geneva Convention, however, "[elvery Contracting
Party . . . retain[s] the right to refuse entry or to expel any
applicant for asylum to a Third State on the basis of its nation-
al provisions and in accordance with its international
commitments."6 '
While this excerpt appears to be a reaffirmation of the
State's right under the Geneva Convention to decide asylum
claims, the retention of a right to expel remains a matter of
concern under the nonrefoulment prohibitions found within
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.62 For example, in 1992
Germany announced an agreement with Romania under which
Romania would accept the return of rejected asylum seekers in
exchange for modest financial assistance.63 Although Article
(UK), Feb. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File [hereinafter
Repelling Borders]. The Schengen Information System, with its central computer
based in Strasbourg, Germany, allows access to a database comprising between
seven to eight million items. See id. Part of the items include entries on 700,000
individuals, including criminals, refugees, and asylum-seekers from both outside
and inside the Schengen area. See id.
" Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 93, art. 23(5).
59 Id. at 95, art. 28.
o Id. at 95, art. 29(1).
61 Id. at 95, art. 29(2).
62 Article 33 of the Geneva Convention provides:
(1) No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by
a refugee when there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.
Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at 176, art. 33.
' See Marc Fisher, Bonn, Bucharest Cement Accord to Repatriate Romanian
12271998]
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28 of the Schengen Convention, expressly referring to the Ge-
neva Convention, restricts the right of a state to expel an
alien, Germany nevertheless violated such provision under
world-wide scrutiny.
In addition to the above, Articles 29 through 38 of the
Schengen Convention raise some concern as they relate direct-
ly to asylum seekers and refugees and impose measures deal-
ing with responsibility for processing asylum applications.6
Specifically, Article 30 of the Convention establishes criteria
for determining which Schengen country should review an
asylum application. If an asylum applicant enters the
Schengen territory65 with a visa, then the state that issued
the visa will be responsible for processing his or her asylum
claim.66 The Schengen provisions impose responsibility on the
state that has permitted the applicant to enter a Schengen
territory, and, consequently, to gain access to the territory of
all other Member States.
If the applicant enters a Schengen territory without a visa,
for the purpose of applying for asylum soon after, the state
across whose external borders the applicant entered the
Schengen territory will be responsible for examining the
claim. 67 In fact, the 1993 Agreement Implementing the
Schengen Agreement contains the provision that an application
for political asylum filed by an applicant in one state precludes
that applicant from seeking asylum in the territories of the
other parties.68  Thus, if a refugee enters into Germany,
Gypsies, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1992, at A27.
64 See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 95-100, arts. 28-
38.
5 'Schengen territory" refers to the aggregate territory of all signatory States.
Currently, this territory includes Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, France,
Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. See Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones
Against Refugees: Dublin, Shengen, and the German Asylum, 33 VA. J. INTL L.
503, 507 (1993).
See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 96, art. 30(1)(a).
See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 97, art. 30(1)(e).
See Agreement Implementing the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985,
Between the Governments of the Countries of the Benelux Economic Union, Ger-
many and France Regarding the Gradual Elimination of Passport and Custom
Control at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, additionally signed by Italy
Nov. 27, 1990, by Portugal and Spain June 25, 1991, and by Greece Nov. 6, 1992,
Arts. 28-38, 1993 BGB1. H 1013, 1996 at 242.
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applies there for asylum there, is subsequently denied, and
then goes to France and applies again, the application will be
transferred back to Germany.
This method, which establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate
an asylum claim by merely assigning the application to the na-
tion across whose external borders the applicant entered the
Schengen territory, does not acknowledge other exceedingly
relevant factors, such as country of origin or language fluency.
For example, a refugee from a West African state, with or
without proper documentation, might prefer to apply for asy-
lum in France. Nevertheless, if, for various reasons, such as
inability to pay or lack of transportation, the applicant is able
to secure transportation only to Frankfurt and not France, the
applicant will be deprived of the right to seek asylum in
France. Under Article 30 of the Schengen Agreement, Germany
is the only state that would have jurisdiction to adjudicate his
or her claim.
As such, Article 30 of the Convention directly violates
provisions of international law. One country's refusal of asylum
status for the whole Schengen territory violates Article 14(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,69 which guaran-
tees a refugee the right to seek asylum in other countries. "By
eliminating an alien's ability to repatriate in ten countries at
once - practically all of Western Europe, this right is effec-
tively stricken." ° Article 30 also directly violates Article 55
and 56 of the U.N. Charter because "[Instead of cooperating to
achieve the goals of the United Nations, the Schengen Conven-
tion is a cooperative effort to impede these goals."7 In addi-
tion, the Convention violates Article 15(2) of the Universal
Declaration since a refugee arbitrarily is denied the right to
change nationalities when the opportunity to solicit protection
is automatically limited to one state. 2
6, UDHR, supra note 18, at 71, art. 14(1).
" Kerry E. McCarron, The Schengen Convention as a Violation of International
Law and the Need for Centralized Adjudication on the Validity of National and
Multilateral Asylum Policies for Members of the United Nations, 18 B.C. INVL &
COMP. L. REv. 401, 422 (1995).
71 Id. at 423.
71 See id. at 425.
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In all of the above cases, the Schengen country responsible
for determining asylum eligibility will process the application
in accordance with its own national law.7" That country must
either admit that person to residence or expel the applicant.74
The Convention clearly provides, however, that no contracting
party is obligated "to authorize every applicant for asylum to
enter or to remain within its territory."7" Although Article 29
of the Convention requires that the Schengen state's decision
to admit or refuse entry be made in accordance with the princi-
ples of international law,7" "[Olut of fear of being less restric-
tive than the other Schengen countries, every state party care-
fully trie[s] to level down its regulations on entry and resi-
dence of aliens in order to avoid an unwanted influx of immi-
grants and asylum seekers, attracted by more favorable
conditions.""
In its endeavor to build a wall around itself, the European
Union "is defining refugees out of existence" by employing new
restrictive definitions for those who qualify for refugee status
and returning asylum seekers to safe countries of origin, which
are far from safe." For example, the number of asylum seek-
ers in Germany dropped from a record high of 438,191 in 1992
to 127,210 in 1994, not because fewer people were in flight
"' See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 97, art. 32.
74 See id. at 97-98, arts. 33, 34.
7 Id. at 95, art. 29(2).
7' Article 29(2) of the Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at
95, reads as follows:
This obligation shall not bind a Contracting Party to authorize every
applicant for asylum to enter or remain within its territory. Every Con-
tracting Party shall retain the right to refuse entry or to expel any ap-
plicant for asylum to a Third State on the basis of its national provisions
and in accordance with its international commitments.
Id.
7 Aleidus woltjer, Schengen: The Way of No Return?, 2 MAASTRicHT J. COMP.
L. 256, 273 (1995).
" U.S. Group: E.U. 'Defining Refugees Out of Existence," DEUTSCHE PRESS-
AGENTUR, Oct. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dra File [hereinafter
Defining Refugees]. The report mentions that both Germany and France define
refugee as a person with reasonable fear of persecution from his or her govern-
ment. See id. Nevertheless, in Algeria, where two-thirds of asylum applicants fear
death or injury from radical Islamic groups, the German or French definition is of
no help. See id. Because the Islamic groups are "non-state," the Algerian asylum-
seekers cannot be considered refugees. See id. In 1996, for example, Germany
granted refugee status to only 9 out of 2,400 Algerian asylum applicants. See id.
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from persecution but because, in 1993, the German govern-
ment amended its constitution and legislation to permit the
removal of asylum seekers to "safe third countries" regardless
of whether those countries provided access to asylum proce-
dures. 9 In practice, all nine of Germany's neighbors have
been declared "safe third countries."'0 Thus, after July 31,
1993, virtually no asylum seeker entering Germany by land is
entitled to protection in Germany."' These provisions violate
Article 31(1) of the Geneva Convention which states,
"[C]ontracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence .... " Germany's amended legis-
lation imposes "penalties" upon the asylum seekers at their
borders.
In its effort to enact barriers against large influxes of
foreigners, Germany also has enacted a constitutional amend-
ment imposing restrictions upon applicants who enter Germa-
ny from other states, "safe countr[ies] of origin," where appli-
cation of the Refugee Convention and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights is assured.82 In other words, applicants
who enter Germany from states that, at a minimum, comply
with the Geneva Convention, will not be granted political asy-
lum. This approach exploits the wording of the Geneva Con-
vention, which does not preclude deportation to a country
where the refugee will be safe from both persecution and
refoulment. Although the concept of "safe country of origin"
does not necessarily contravene international law, it disregards
the spirit of the Geneva Convention. The German approach
reflects the broader European attempts to structure a legal
framework for refugee law that restricts access to asylum.
" See UNHCR, Protection of, or Protection from, Refugees?, in REFUGEES: ASY-
LUM IN EUROPE 13 (1995).
,O "Safe zones" or "humanitarian centers" have been established by the Europe-
an Union, and declared legal, in Kosovo and Albania. Although the U.S. Commit-
tee for Refugees considers these so-called "safe zones" either inadequate or non-
existent (for example, Srebenica, in Bosnia, was a safe zone, but since United
Nations security was inadequate in that area, Srebenica experienced one of the
worst massacres of the Bosnian war), the E.U. States can now insist that the
refugees from Kosovo and Albania return to those zones instead of remaining in
western Europe. The new German constitutional amendment on "safe third country
law" with regard to refugees, targets the Kosovar refugees by sending them back
to Albania. See Defining Refugees, supra note 78.
" See UNHCR, supra note 79, at 12-13.
82 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 16a (F.R.G.).
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Similarly, the Convention provides a detailed external
border control mechanism meant to facilitate free movement
across internal borders.' Any alien lacking complete and val-
id documents must be refused entry into the territories of the
contracting parties.' The only exception is the admission of
an alien "on humanitarian grounds or in the national interest
or because of international obligations."'
This external border control mechanism introduced the
controversial notion of so-called "carrier's responsibility." Arti-
cle 26 of the Schengen Convention imposes upon carriers the
obligation "to take all necessary measures to ensure that an
alien carried by air or by sea is in possession of travel docu-
ments required for entry into the territory of the Contracting
Partners." 6 This provision introduces carrier sanctions into
the legislation of the European countries by imposing "penal-
ties on carriers who transport aliens who do not possess the
necessary travel documents by air or sea from a Third State to
their territories.""7 Article 26 also requires compliance "in ac-
cordance with their constitutional law."8 Some Schengen
States, including Belgium and the Netherlands, already have
enacted statutory offenses as required by these Schengen
provisions.
Article 26 of the Convention minimizes the purpose of
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention, which addresses the issue
of "refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge." Specifically,
Paragraph 1 of the Geneva Convention states:
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of
Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authoriza-
tion, provided they present themselves without delay to the authori-
ties and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."9
The purpose of Article 31 is to protect arriving refugees
from "penalties" and to recognize in international law that
See Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 86-88, arts. 3-5.
See id. at 87, art. 4.
" Id. at 87, art. 5(2).
8' Id. at 94, art. 26(1)(b).
'1 Id. at 95, art. 26(2).
Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 7, at 95, art. 26(2).
, Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at 174, art. 31.
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refugees may be unable to obtain normal immigration docu-
ments and may resort to extra-legal measures in order to flee
persecution and seek asylum." The more an asylum seeker
conforms to the definition of refugee under Article 26 of the
Schengen Convention, the less likely she or he is going to be
able to obey the rules of immigration and control.
Based on the foregoing, the measures enacted in Article 26
with respect to the integration of "carrier's responsibility" in
the struggle against illegal immigration might operate in some
individual cases to prevent persons in need of international
protection from leaving their country and reaching a Schengen
state where they have access to procedures for the determina-
tion of their status. This restriction could make escape from
persecution much more difficult for potential refugees. By
penalizing the airlines and sealines for bringing asylum seek-
ers to Europe without a visa, Article 26(2) makes it more diffi-
cult for refugees to obtain sanctuary. Moreover, it does not
distinguish between asylum seekers and other aliens.9' As one
commentator has noted, "[M]aking it more difficult for asylum
seekers to actually present an application may constitute
violations of the Geneva Convention." 2
C. The Dublin Convention on Asylum
The Dublin Convention, signed on June 15, 1990, by
France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the three Benelux
countries, is the first legal instrument of international law that
defines concepts such as "asylum request" or "asylum claim"
and "asylum seeker."93 According to the Dublin Convention,
an "Application for asylum means: a request whereby an alien
seeks from a Member State protection under the Geneva Con-
vention by claiming refugee status within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1 of the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New York
"See id.
" See UNHCR Position on Conventions Recently Concluded in Europe, Aug. 16,
1991, at 5.
" David OKeeffe, The Emergence of a European Immigration Policy, 20 EUR.
L. REV. 20, 23 (1995).
13 See ASYLUM IN EUROPE, AN INTRODUCTION 77 (Gilbert Jaeger et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1993) [hereinafter ASYLUM IN EUROPE].
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Protocol." 94 An applicant for asylum is defined as "an alien
who has made an application for asylum in respect of which a
final decision has not yet been taken."95
As an extension to the Schengen Convention, the Dublin
Convention exclusively addresses the issue of examination of
asylum claims.98 While lacking substantive rules for asylum
harmonization,97 the Dublin Convention sets out explicit rules
that precisely determine which state shall be responsible for
processing and deciding an asylum case." Accordingly, the
country that an asylum-seeker first enters is responsible for
deciding that individual's asylum claim,99 unless the asylum-
seeker has close connections with a particular country."0 The
Dublin Convention, therefore, limits the responsibility for asy-
lum applications to only one Member State.1"' The asylum
application must be examined "by that State in accordance
with its national laws and its international obligations.""2 If
the asylum-seeker applies in another state, then that state has
the right to send the refugee to the state identified by the rules
as responsible, the "country of first asylum," which must then
physically accept the refugee and process the asylum
application.'
The country of first asylum (also known as "safe third
country" or "host third country" or "first asylum country") is a
country in which the asylum seeker either found protection, or
reasonably could have done so."0 4 "Country of first asylum"
agreements provide that an applicant who has traveled
through a state in which the applicant could have sought asy-
lum may be denied access to the asylum process there and
instead returned to the "country of first asylum" to pursue
their asylum claim.' 5
" Dublin Convention, supra note 8, at 430, art. 1(b).
9' Id. at 430, art. 1(c).
9' See id. at 431-32, art. 3.
See Neuman, supra note 65, at 506.
98 See Dublin Convention, supra note 8, at 431-32, art. 3(1)-(7).
9' See id. at 434, arts. 6-7; see also id. at 432, art. 3(6).
100 See id. at 432, art. 4.
lo See id. at 431, art. 3(2).
o See id. at 431, art. 3(3).
'o See Dublin Convention, supra note 8, at 435-37, arts. 10-11.
104 See, e.g., id. at 431-32, art. 3(2), 3(7); see also id. at 435-36, at arts. 10-11.
'" See id. at 431-32, arts. 3(2), 3(7).
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Not surprisingly, the principle of "country of first asylum"
conflicts with important obligations under the Geneva Conven-
tion. The Geneva Convention recognizes that each asylum
seeker has the right to be recognized in different countries,
because, under the Geneva Convention, each signatory has the
obligation to make its own judgment regarding recognition or
refusal of an asylum application.' Thus, the Dublin
Convention's attempt to identify a single "responsible" State
for an asylum applicant conflicts with each state's obligation
under the Geneva Convention requirements. These require-
ments mandate that each signatory state maintain the proper
procedures to assure that, in refusing the applicant's request to
remain, the state is not returning him or her to danger.
The "country of first asylum" rule is the Dublin
Convention's mechanism of choice to end the "refugee in orbit"
or "asylum-shopping" problem.07 The "refugee in orbit" term
refers to the circulation of refugees and asylum seekers among
multiple countries in search of a State willing to determine
their claim to refugee status.' The "orbit" practice would al-
legedly be suppressed only when a Member State would refer
an asylum application to another state, if the latter is the
"responsible" state.0 9 However, a Member State responsible
for examining the application, unwilling to be in charge, may
decide to refer the asylum applicant to a third country that
could be a non-E.U. country. For example, asylum seekers
have entered Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in transit to
the United Kingdom, which has returned them to these "first
asylum" states, which have then returned them to the United
Kingdom."0 Also, a non-contracting country may, directly or
indirectly, return a refugee in orbit to his or her country of
origin, in violation of the nonrefoulment provision of Article 33
108 See Geneva Convention, supra note 11.
107 A refugee in orbit is an asylum-seeker who is sent back and forth among
different states that consider each other primarily responsible for the refugee. See
Dublin Convention, supra note 8, preamble (stating purpose "to ensure that appli-
cants for asylum are not referred successively from one Member State to another
without any of these States acknowledging itself to be competent to examine the
application for asylum").
10" Dublin Convention, supra note 8, at 432-35, arts. 4-8.
1. See id.
"o See BRITISH SECTION, AMNESTY INTL, PASSING THE BUCK: DEFICIENT HOME
OFFICE PRACTICE IN 'SAFE THIRD CoUNTRY' ASYLUM CASES 5 (1993).
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of the Geneva Convention. Thus, in contrast to their intended
effect, the Schengen and Dublin Conventions do not necessarily
suppress the "refugee in orbit" problem which exists between
Member States and approximately 170 Third States."' "Refu-
gee in orbit" situations will not likely be avoided by this prac-
tice; on the contrary, they probably will increase in number.
Finally, in addition to the above drawbacks, the Schengen
and Dublin Conventions, two key instruments in the immigra-
tion control of Western Europe, were devised largely behind
closed doors. As a result, "the European states ... approached
the law-making task regarding refugees and asylum-seekers
from an administrative and bureaucratic direction with little
regard to the special human rights requirements."" In addi-
tion, "[Blecause these measures are excluded from the scope of
the Union's legal system, their legitimacy is not subject to
review by the European Parliament or Commission .... "
D. The Treaty on European Union of February 7, 1992
(Maastricht Treaty)
A third attempt to facilitate increased cooperation and
harmonization among European parties includes the Treaty on
European Union signed in Maastricht"" on February 7, 1992,
which addresses different "protocols" on specific topics."5
Member States cooperate in areas such as Economic and Mon-
etary Union, Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and
Home Affairs including immigration and asylum.' Although
... See ASYLUM IN EUROPE, supra note 93, at 81.
112 GIL LOESCHER, REFUGEES AND THE ASYLUM DILEMMA IN THE WEST 104
(1992).
13 O'Keeffe, supra note 92, at 22.
MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1.
111 See id. at 353-62.
116 See id. For example, in September 1998, E.U. Home Affairs and Justice min-
isters met in Brussels to establish "Eurodac," a central fingerprint database for
refugees who apply in more than one Schengen state. A computerized fingerprint
recognition system, Eurodac, is intended to speed up the processing of asylum
applications by identifying the first Schengen country to receive the individual's
application. Even if the applicant uses false or different identity papers in differ-
ent states, a fingerprint cross-check on the database will signal if the asylum-seek-
er has applied in another country. Once refugee status is granted or 10 years
have passed, the individual's fingerprint record is erased from Eurodac. In con-
1236 [Vol. 64: 4
EUROPEAN UNION POLICY ONASYLUM
the twelve Member States established among themselves a
European Union,"7 the Maastricht treaty did not succeed in
creating a European federal state."8
Specifically, the Maastricht Treaty expands the European
Union's powers in areas of alien, refugee and immigra-
tion/asylum policy."9 Article G of the Maastricht Treaty,
which amends the Treaty of Rome establishing the European
Economic Community with a purpose of establishing the Euro-
pean Community, provides that the activities of the Communi-
ty shall include, as provided in the Treaty and in accordance
with the timetable set out therein, "(d) measures concerning
the entry and moving of persons in the internal market as
provided for in Article 100C." 2° According to Article 100C(1),
the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, "acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, shall determine the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when
crossing the external borders of the Member States." 2' The
second paragraph of the same article states that, "in the event
trast, fingerprints of deported asylum-seekers remain on the database, so that
immigration authorities at borders, ports, and airports may deny access to the
deported individuals. See Fingerprint Data to Curtail Asylum Options, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (UK), Oct. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Promt File.
117 See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1, at 255, art. A.
118 See Dr. Dieter Kugelmann, Mainz, The Maastricht Treaty And The Design Of
A European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INTL & COMP. L.J. 335, 354 (1994).
119 See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1, at 256, art. G(C)(23) (adding art.
100(c)(1) to The Treaty of Rome). For example, Title IV of the Maastricht Treaty
gives the European Union a major role in European security, law enforcement,
and immigration and asylum policy, referred to as the "third pillar." Article K
facilitates this role through the newly created Council of Justice and Interior Min-
isters. One of its subgroups, the K4 Committee, oversees Europol, or the pan-Euro-
pean police organization. With its headquarters opened in the Hague, in February
1994, Europol is particularly concerned with organized crimes. For example, the
European Drugs Unit, a subdivision of Europol, produces reports on organized
drug crimes in Europe. K4 Committee is also empowered with the creation of the
European Information System, a new E.U. computer system covering all aspects ofimmigration and related law enforcement activities, and with access to all
Schengen and non-Schengen territories. As a non-Schengen country, Britain is
extremely interested in the implementation of the computer network, because,
regardless of the British government's position on Schengen immigration policy,
British agencies will be able to be fully integrated in, and to benefit from, the
E.U.-wide computer network. See Repelling Borders, supra note 57.
20 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1, at 257, art. G(d).
... Id. at 259, art. 6(B)(3)(d); id. at 264, art. 6(C)(23).
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of an emergency situation in a third country posing a threat of
a sudden inflow of nationals from that country into the Com-
munity, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a recom-
mendation of the Commission, may introduce, for a period not
exceeding six months, a visa requirement for nationals for the
country in question."122 According to paragraph 5, "This arti-
cle shall be without prejudice to the exercise of the responsibil-
ities incumbent upon the Member States with regard to the
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal
security.""2 Finally, Article 100C(3) provides that. "From 1
January 1996, the Council shall act by a qualified majority on
the decisions referred to in paragraph 1."' Notwithstanding
the above, the Schengen and Dublin provisions regarding com-
mon policy on visa in relation to third countries currently in
force between Member States will remain in effect until the
Community adopts new directives.'
III. SOLUTION
Because the Schengen and Dublin Conventions are not
part of Community law, and therefore are immune to adjudica-
tion by the Court of Justice, there is no common authority or
court responsible for immigration and asylum law and policy
within the entire Schengen territory. Without accountability to
the E.U. legal system, judges cannot guarantee the uniform
and correct application of the regulations. As a result, an alien
denied entry into the Schengen territory by means of a nega-
tive finding in one state of the territory has no territory-wide
recourse to claims of discrimination in violation of her or his
human rights. Therefore, an international common authority
in this field is needed to protect the rights of refugees with
valid asylum claims who are kept out of the Schengen
territory.
Today, Member States' attempts to cut back on immigra-
tion and asylum may be a reflection of their fear of losing con-
trol over economic and social matters. With the emergence of
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1, at 259, art. 6(B)(3)(d); id. at 264, art.
6(C)(23).
" See id.
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the European Monetary Union and the accession of new mem-
bers, Europe's political landscape has been fundamentally
changed. The beginning of the third stage of the European
Monetary Union, set for January 1, 1999, will be marked by
the relocation of all economic and monetary policies to E.U.
institutions and severe constraints on national budgets. Fear-
ing loss of national sovereignty and being more concerned
about national unemployment and depletion of social resourc-
es, Member States are less likely to tolerate changes in asylum
policy. Currently, more liberal immigration and asylum policies
are perceived as the cause for increased unemployment and
crime.
The entry of countries from the East of the European Un-
ion should provide an excellent opportunity to return to real
solutions, including reshaping the Schengen and Dublin Con-
ventions. Specifically, the decision to enlarge the European
Union, without addressing immigration and asylum issues, will
only exacerbate the problem. The accession of Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic will require the European Monetary
Union to redistribute regional funds, which will, in turn, be
received by these newcomers with lower levels of economic
development. A common authority, ideally under the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' ("UNHCR") supervi-
sion, could tailor a certain percentage of the funding to these
poorer States so that such E.U. States would independently
address the problem of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers
on their respective territories, while still fulfilling their obliga-
tions under the Schengen and Dublin Conventions.
Finally, although the Geneva Convention has been criti-
cized for being vague in its "refugee" definition and ambiguous
with regard to the right to receive asylum, the right of admis-
sion, and the right to temporary refuge, it is not the frame-
work of the Refugee Convention that is in foremost need of
revision. The focus instead should be on the E.U. politics,
which are dictated by the European Monetary Union. More-
over, to consider the Geneva Convention as irrelevant or obso-
lete would be a mistake. Despite the growing implementation
of hard-line asylum policies and the adoption of temporary
measures in response to mass refugees, the Geneva Convention
is still a cardinal element in refugee protection. In the complex
European framework, characterized by tensions between sub-
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stantive harmonization and national sovereignty, the Geneva
Convention is a necessary buffer between incoherent immigra-
tion and asylum policies of affluent nations and inherent rights
of asylum seekers.
CONCLUSION
With the implementation of the Schengen and Dublin
Conventions, the rights of aliens became more limited. Instead
of giving refugees an opportunity to choose a state in which
they might like to gain asylum or one which has relatively
permissive immigration and asylum laws, the Schengen Group
decides under what nation's law a refugee's application is to be
processed. This policy constitutes a violation of the Geneva
Convention and Article 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, with E.U. Member States
undertaking a tightening of their national immigration and
asylum laws, greater emphasis is placed on controlling illegal
immigration, which inevitably restricts movement of non-Euro-
pean nationals. Implemented measures such as new visa regu-
lations and identity checks impede, rather than promote, free
movement within the European Union.
For the Western tradition of asylum to be maintained, an
international common authority in this field must be estab-
lished. Meeting behind closed doors has resulted in closing the
doors of Europe on too many refugees.
Gabriela I. Coman
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